

they sent the governor was mistaken. This he learned later in a letter of June 13 of this year. Rúbric of Croix.] Within the province they assaulted at night the mission of Rosario, carrying off twenty-two persons. (The captives' names I do not list because they are of the same race as the aggressors.) They commit frequent robberies successfully, for they are familiar with the environs of the presidio of La Bahia and its missions.

¶ 14. But these injuries are not comparable to those which the Comanche inflict. The province is overrun with these Indians, now alone, or as allies of the Nations of the North; at the moment not a foot of land is free from hostility. Its fruits of the field are despoiled, cattle ranches and farms that the happy days of peace had built up are rapidly being abandoned, and the settlers in terror are taking refuge in the settlements, nor do they venture to leave their neighborhood without a troop escort.

¶ 15. The new settlement of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli was attacked by the Comanche while suffering from a calamitous inundation of the river on whose banks it was recently established. The settlers saw themselves obliged to abandon it, seek asylum among the friendly nations, and flee to the old abandoned mission of Nacodoches. There they subsist in the greatest danger and with no support save that, risky and intermittent, which the presidio of San Antonio de Bejar can supply them over the great distance of one hundred and twenty-five leagues, although they are but fifty leagues from the post of Natchitoches, attached to the Louisiana government, whose infantry garrison is needed for its own defense.¹⁰

¶ 16. The above presidio of Bejar and the Villa of San Fernando, capital of the province, are built, in spite of their long establishment, with huts and little wooden houses which a wind and rain storm largely destroyed last year. They have neither walls nor stockade to protect them from the attacks of the Indians.

¶ 17. In the five contiguous missions is a small number of In-

¹⁰ See Bolton, *Athanaze de Mézières*, II, 259-61, 271, 289, 304, 309-10.

dians taken in force from the coast of the Colony of New Santander. Consequently they contribute little to the defense of the province and some frequent annoyance by running away to the homelands where they were born.¹¹

¶ 18. Finally, it is not possible for the presidial companies of Bejar and La Bahia to attend to so many urgent and distant matters. If they were in a perfect condition, they would be without doubt respected by the enemy. The consequences are the sly, unpunished hostilities of the Comanche or the open threat of the Indians of the North whenever so inclined, or those of the Lipan Apache who can subsist only by robbery, and those of the vile Carancaguazes.

¶ 19. Such is the sad situation of the province of Texas. Its governor, Don Domingo Cabello, describes it extensively in repeated representations, proposing the extermination of the Lipan and Carancaguazes, and the means of restraining the Nations of the North by increasing troops in the province of his command up to the number of five hundred men to be taken from the garrison of Havana and transported in small boats to the coast of San Bernardo. But although I recognize the need of the assistance, I advert also to the exact causes and considerations which make it difficult now.

¶ 20. The governor has solicited this aid since the time he was an infantryman, when he recognized the real dangers to the territory of Texas. In this official report he has assumed the responsibilities under which his honor and office place him.

¶ 21. With this object in mind, I put the company of Bejar upon the footing of one hundred men and that of Bahia on the footing of sixty-three men, adding thirty-three units to their old allowance. These the king was pleased to approve. I, without means or powers for a larger increase, was not able to do more, nor can I do anything else than to advise the governor, with the convenience which the great distance from this capital to the province of Texas permits, of the measures which I have considered proper to avert the ruin of that terri-

¹¹ Morfi, *Viaje*, 225-30 describes these missions. See also Morfi, *History of Texas*, Chaps. V, VIII-X.

tory. However, my elementary commands have been executed with felicity under the intelligence, zeal, and knowledge of the governor, even before he had received them.¹²

¶ 22. As soon as this chief communicated to me the first news of the hostility of the Comanche, under date of July 17, '80, I replied to him on September 23 following. Therein I stated that I understood the grave evils threatening the province and that the small forces which garrisoned it would not be able to remedy them; but that, although I might wish to increase the staff because of necessity and of my zealous desires, it was morally impossible. The same urgencies existed in all the provinces of my command, so that the latter would be ruined if I should take their garrisons away to aid Texas. Furthermore, his Majesty, in the very recent royal order, commanded me absolutely to minimize the present costs because of the many and large expenses which the just war with the English was causing.

¶ 23. Convinced that at the time this important matter did not demand immediate attention, I had itemized in the general increase of forces the presidial companies of his command. I was persuaded that this aid would be sufficient for a respectable defensive war, if the unfortunate condition of the troops, their administration, instruction, and discipline were altered according to the means repeatedly advised so that we could use them in useful, safe maneuvers and operations, and as far as possible similar to those of the Indian enemies.

¶ 24. I was convinced that it was necessary to satisfy the complaints and quiet the unrest of the Nations of the North by honestly overlooking the injuries lately received, and by gentle persuasion which they could never attribute to our weakness, but to our desires of conserving peace for convenience and benefit of the Indians themselves. To achieve these ends, it appears proper to me that either through the captains of the militias of the pueblo of Bucareli, Don Antonio Gil

¹² A.G.I., Guad., 276, Croix to Gálvez, No. 154, Valle de Santa Rosa, February 15, 1778; A.H.N. Estado, 3883, Croix to Gálvez, No. 68, México, July 26, 1777.

Ybarbo, or the commander of Natchitoches, or by means of some particular emissary of confidence, some suitable present should be made to the Taovayaces and Tagaucanas nations, the most quarrelsome and warlike; that the emissary should inform himself carefully of the condition and of the ideas of these Indians; that he should persuade them of the benefits of peace; and if he should find the Comanche receptive to it, he should extend it to them at once. On the other hand, he should attempt skillfully to break the alliance of the Comanche with the Taovayaces and Taguacanas; that in the case that these three nations, or the last two, should embrace peace, he should proceed at once to make and ratify it under honorable capitulations possible of fulfillment on our part.

¶ 25. When the governor received these resolutions, he had already forestalled them in all respects, having so commissioned Don Nicolas de la Matte, settler of Louisiana, who by a fortunate coincidence, was in the presidio of Bejar.

¶ 26. The complete instructions which the governor gave to la Matte, as well as the spirit, honor, zeal, efficiency, and knowledge of the nations and understanding of some of their languages which this emissary possesses, promise the best results.

¶ 27. He set out from Bejar in November of the year '80, and on the last day of February found himself near the pueblos of the Taguacanas and Taovayaces. He had with him two faithful and expert interpreters, citizens of Louisiana, but now established in the province of Texas, the customary presents, and the intention of reaching New Mexico whence he must report to me.

¶ 28. These are, most excellent sir, the only measures which can be taken to ward off the desolation of the territories of Texas, but the funds of gratification of the presidial companies of Bejar and La Bahia cannot support their demands: the annual presents which the Indians expect, the particular expenses which they cause when they come to visit the governor, and the incidental ones on the account of the Lipan.

¶ 29. These indispensable presents will be useless if the Nations of the North lack barter and trade. They cannot be made at the expense of the king without his royal permission; to obtain that involves many considerations, and safeguards, and besides the routine of preparing a file of papers of detailed proceedings. If it must be continued by private traders, the war with the English may impede it.¹³ Its reestablishment will have to be delayed because of the necessary interchange of my reports with the governor of Louisiana and his replies, as I do not consider it proper that trade should be carried on by the settlers of the province of Texas.

¶ 30. By no means until war is concluded, can anything advantageous be done to keep the greedy nations of the Indians of the North content and quiet. I shall always see myself applying superficial remedies that will only serve to minimize the hostilities during some seasons, with the risk that the same remedies may stimulate fickleness, lack of confidence, and pride of these nations.

¶ 31. While they remain quiet, the Lipan will cause no especial anxiety in the province of Texas. It will not be necessary to change the governor's treatment of them; one can control the attacks of the Carancaguazes.

¶ 32. I have not been able to execute the campaign projected against these Indians, which I announced to your Excellency in letter No. 268, September 27, '78,¹⁴ and in paragraph 9 of the secret communication of March 29 of the year following.¹⁵ The reasons appear in an extensive file of papers in the possession of the assessor and of which I shall give an account to your Excellency when it is in condition. I shall do the same with the proceeding itself. It is relative to all matters touching hostilities of the Comanche, the perfidy of the Lipan, the unrest of the Indians of the North, the propositions and petitions of Governor Don Domingo Cabello.

¹³ A.G.I., Guad., 278, Croix to Gálvez, No. 487, Arispe, February 23, 1780; *Ibid.*, Croix to Gálvez, No. 488, Arispe, February 23, 1780.

¹⁴ A.G.I., Guad., 270, Croix to Gálvez, No. 268, Chihuahua, September 23, 1778.

¹⁵ See above, page 11, footnote 10.

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¶ 33. I believe that nothing is more difficult for this chief than the conservation of the peace with the Indians of the North and the Lipan. As the attendance of both at San Antonio de Bejar is unavoidable, a very delicate situation will supervene. As already noted, this obliges him to avail himself of means doubtful or impossible of success: warding off lamentable encounters, making the Indians happy and dispelling their suspicions of our friendships, to which, although barbarians, they are usually prey. They notice that we extend it to all without taking sides in the aggravations which the Northerners and Lipan cause one another, and that we overlook the attacks and robberies which they make upon the province by buying their friendship with presents in place of proceeding to their punishment. But it is apparent that the governor has managed until the present time these difficult affairs with the greatest zeal, prudence, skill, and felicity. Not only have I considered it fit to leave him free to exercise his powers, but I have had them extended so that he might do everything that appears best according to cases and events which occur, giving me an account of the results. Having set forth the just recommendation of his merit, I am submitting it to your Excellency so that the piety of the king may be pleased to dispense to this interested party the grace which may be his sovereign pleasure.

¶ 34. In the meantime, I shall conclude the particular report concerning the province of Texas, setting forth in brief statements the only means of contributing to its well-being.

¶ 35. The means are nothing more than what was agreed upon in the councils of war¹⁶ which I remitted to your Excellency, but they demand the increase of troops and the necessity of representing to his Majesty that the Lipan Apache are not worthy of the sovereign piety his royal Catholic spirit dispenses them in the royal order of February 20 of '79.¹⁷

¶ 36. I would set forth the simple explanation of this means with brief, congruent reasons, if I considered the support of larger forces possible. These being out of the question, I think

¹⁶ See above, pages 35, 36, 39, footnotes 104, 105, 108, 121.

¹⁷ See above, page 43, footnote 141.

it necessary to maintain peace with the Nations of the North, to establish barter and commerce by the settlers of Louisiana with the permission of the government of Texas, to fix a quantity annually for presents and gifts at San Antonio de Bejar, to support and develop the pueblo of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli, and to continue the principle of stirring up the mutual antagonism between the Nations of the North and the Lipan.

¶ 37. But the first is impossible while war with the English lasts; the second is insufficient; the third demands expenses; and the fourth is venturesome and can be dangerous to the province itself, and especially to those of Coahuila and the Colony of Nuevo Santander.

¶ 38. To free the province of Texas from the attacks of the Carancaguazes, there is no choice other than that of attacking by sea and land the small number of this nation and transporting it to an overseas destination. But neither the port of Vera Cruz nor that of New Orleans can, under the present system, provide boats and troops, nor should the troops of the province of Texas itself give preference to this matter in place of the more urgent ones in which they ought to engage themselves.

¶ 39. All these difficulties are for the present insuperable. Consequently there approaches either the risk of abandoning the province of Texas [or the necessity] of uniting at one or two points all its forces.

¶ 40. I would be of the opinion that the troop and settlers of the presidio of La Bahia de Espíritu Santo, the Indians of its missions, the garrison of the detachment of Arroyo del Cibolo, and the settlers of the new settlement of Bucareli should be incorporated into the Villa of San Fernando and in the five missions of its jurisdiction.

¶ 41. To convince one of the utility of this opinion it is sufficient to say that the united forces would conserve the dominion of the province and make themselves respected by all classes of enemies.

¶ 42. The Villa of San Fernando has whatever requirements can be desired for the establishment of a populous city even if it were not easy to embrace in its suburbs the five opulent missions, situated within a district of seven leagues.

¶ 43. The Indians are not capable of impeding an establishment so advantageous. Fortified, it could resist any feared invasion by neighboring foreign colonies.

¶ 44. Besides the progress which could result without doubt from the union of forces, new settlements would be erected with strong and competent colonists drawn from the capital. Finally, the dominion of Texas, assured of protection in the vast extent of its territory, would merit the name of Province. A result of those achievements would be the reducing of the numerous nations of barbarous Indians with the pious, prudent, and gentle means which the royal order of February 20 of '79 envisages. The respect of the Indians for some establishments, well ordered and advantageously situated for sustaining themselves, would be much more possible.

¶ 45. Brigadier Don Pedro de Rivera, in paragraphs 41 to 47 of the third part of his report, or project, which he presented to the viceroy, Marqués de Casafuerte, under date of December 7, '28,¹⁸ considered useless the continuance of the presidio of La Bahia de Espíritu Santo. Lieutenant General Marqués de Rubí did not recommend it in that report which he made to Viceroy Marqués de Croix, under date of April 10, '68.¹⁹ I do not consider that the operations in which the company of this presidio have been and are employed are worth the expense of 21,534 pesos, which their annual allotment amounts to.

¶ 46. At the time of its erection, the Indians of the coast were not worth noticing; today they make themselves respected. Now larger forces than those which the above company has

¹⁸ Regarding Rivera in Texas, Charles W. Hackett, "Visitador Rivera's Criticism of Aguayo's Work in Texas," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XVI (May, 1936), 162-72. See also Morfi, *History of Texas*, Part II, Index, especially the editor's notes.

¹⁹ The report referred to here is the *Dictámenes*. See above, page 16, footnote 21. See also Herbert E. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 106-8; and Morfi, *History of Texas*, Chap. X.

are necessary to subject them and are asked for. The presidio cannot stop the night attacks on the mission of Rosario, established a short league from the presidio, nor can it in any manner prevent the massacre of those shipwrecked on the coast, nor oppose with advantage the attacks of the Indians of the North, nor lend assistance opportunely to the presidio of Bejar and Villa of San Fernando, nor extend it to the Colony of New Santander. Finally, the terrain in which Bahia and its missions are situated does not provide the best resources for settlement, except the use of water from the river for irrigating the crops. This work, valued at more than seven thousand pesos, is made difficult because of lack of funds.

¶ 47. Governor Don Domingo Cabello has proposed, and sought my permission, to withdraw the detachment at the Arroyo del Cíbolo,²⁰ established in the neighborhood of the road from Bejar to La Bahia, because it does not have competent troops to garrison it, and because the site which it occupies is as exposed to surprise by the enemies as it is useless for settlement.

¶ 48. The wandering population of Bucareli does not serve Nacodoches according to the well-founded reports of the deceased Lieutenant Colonel Don Athanaze de Mézières.²¹ It will be satisfactory in its original establishment upon the banks of the Rio de la Trinidad, but it needs support for diverting water, which fertilizes the fields, and for defending its settlers in a spot surrounded by enemies and far from the rest of the settlements of the province.

¶ 49. All that has been set forth favors my opinion of union of forces of the troops and settlers in the Villa of San Fernando and its missions, but at once the following difficulties present themselves: if the presidio of La Bahia is abandoned, who will impede the establishment of foreigners on the coast? How can the Indians of the missions of Espíritu Santo and El Rosario be persuaded to leave them? The Xaramanes will

²⁰ For data on the detachment at Cíbolo, see Bolton, *Athanaze de Mézières*, II, *passim*; Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, III, note 12; and Morfi, *History of Texas*, Part I, 49, 50, 69, 79, 418-20.

²¹ Bolton, *Athanaze de Mézières*, II, 304, 309-10.

re-apostatize and flee to the rancherias of the Indians of the North as the Indians of Rosario will among the Carancaguazes. The settlers of Bucareli retired, how shall we satisfy the complaints of the Indian allies who love and desire the neighborhood of the Spaniards? They will avenge this aggravation, and the communication with Louisiana will be closed to us. Finally, what concept will the barbarous nations form of the general and unseasonable abandonment? They will at once attribute it to cowardice and their boldness will increase.

¶ 50. I answer the first: that Bahia de San Bernardo is accessible only to small boats since it has hardly, at high tide, fourteen spans of water; the coast is swampy and likely to overflow, if credit is given to the information acquired since the year 1686 and the reconnaissance made by Brigadiers Don Pedro de Rivera and Don Diego de Ortiz Parilla.²² But even if this be not certain, who will burden the governor of Texas with the repetition of reconnaissances and the measures for detaching competent bodies of troops, who at opportune times may examine the coast and dislodge foreigners who are attempting to establish themselves on it?

¶ 51. To the second, I state: that the small number of Indians gathered in the mission of Espíritu Santo and El Rosario does not merit much consideration since, if one attempts to transfer them to a better place with gentleness and skill, they will resent it; that even if there should be apostasy of some, that ought not to be surprising for even now they are capricious, yet return to their mission with the same serenity of spirit with which they undertook flight; and that if we place ourselves far away from the watering places where cattle, tame or wild, gather, it could not be at such great distance as to impede the union and march of settlers, with an escort of troops, to collect and butcher what might be needed, as the Lipan do when hunger impels them or when they wish to forestall it with prompt measures.

¶ 52. As to the third, it is undeniable that the establishment

²² Parilla was sent by Rubí (Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 104-6).

of the presidio of Bucareli among the Indian friends contributes to the conservation of peace. Some nations, however, break the peace because they consider themselves threatened by the presidio or because it incites their natural war spirit. In such cases the settlers will suffer, as they actually do. Some time they will be the victim of massacres and fury of the enemies. Such a possibility and not remote misfortune will close the hazardous communication which we have today with the settlers of the post of Natchitoches, and not with the province of Louisiana.

¶ 53. Finally, conclusions that the barbarous nations would draw from the abandonment of our weak settlements of the province of Texas are unimportant. The principle of uniting the settlers at the capital and in its contiguous missions is well founded as we would construct for ourselves an establishment which would instill terror in the Indians. With respect to the possibility of foreign colonies being established on the coast, the catastrophe which Governor Don Domingo Cabello announces repeatedly would not eventuate. The increase of troops would not be necessary; he would have them in abundance in the possible formation and advantageous organization of useful militias. In a few years the province of Texas would flourish and put itself into communication, without opposition or with smaller risks, with those of Louisiana, Coahuila, and New Santander with particular benefit to all, and with hopes that an active commerce by sea and land would give them the stimulus which the present system does not permit.

¶ 54. Notwithstanding, I do not think of putting into effect my opinion without seeing the results of the commission conferred upon the emissary Don Nicolas de la Matte; without hearing that of the governor of the province; without assuring myself of the advantages of which I conceive; and without having the royal approbation of his Majesty, unless the hostilities continue and the destruction of the province forces me to take urgently the indicated measures.

¶ 55. In the meantime, I shall wait to see what the governor

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accomplishes by his plan to have the settlers, at their own expense and labor and without draining the royal treasury, but with the assistance of troops which I have offered him, come in nearer the stockade in the presidio of Bejar and the Villa of San Fernando, there to apply themselves to the raising of abundant crops for their own support, as well as to provide forage for the horses of the presidial company, in stable in dry and wet seasons, and in pasture in the springtime in the field near the post. With these ends achieved, it will be possible to instruct and train the troops and have them always united and in condition to oppose any invasions of enemies, patrol the terrain of the frontier, and undertake other more useful operations. Their training may even enable them to prevent the unfortunate deaths, which the Indians cause in small detachments, of troops established far from their posts for the purpose of cutting hay, looking for stampeded horses, or protecting small groups of settlers, who venture to cross regions of the greatest danger perhaps without arms and always ignorant of their use.²³

PROVINCE OF COAHUILA

¶56

EIGHT thousand souls in eight villas of Spaniards, four pueblos of Indians, four missions, five presidios, eight establishments, divided into eleven jurisdictions populate the vast territories of the province of San Francisco de Coahuila or New Extramadura.²⁴ It deserves this title (of province)

²³ A.G.I., Guad., 275, No. 267, Chihuahua, September 23, 1778. On Caranaguaz, Croix to Gálvez, No. 268, see above, page 81, footnote 14. On Ripperda's life and difficulties with the settlers, see Morfi, *History of Texas*, Part II, index; see also above, page 33, footnote 98.

²⁴ On the origin of Coahuila see Vito Alessio Robles, *Francisco de Urdiñola y el norte de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1931). (Hereinafter cited: Robles *Urdiñola*). The *estado* of Coahuila's population is found in A.G.I., Guad., 267, Croix to Gálvez, No. 208, Chihuahua, June 1, 1778. Regarding Croix's measures and reports of officials concerning Coahuila previous to March, 1779, see A.G.I., Guad., 615, Croix to Gálvez, No. 69, México, July 26, 1777; *ibid.*, No. 75, México, July 26, 1777; *ibid.*, No. 94, Querétaro, August 23, 1777; *ibid.*, No. 108, Durango, October 10, 1777; *ibid.*, No. 124, Hacienda de Patos, November 24, 1777; A.G.I., Guad., 276, Croix to Gálvez, No. 153, Valle de Santa Rosa,